You only need to view a few forums or grab a few news articles to see that debates regarding encryption and other security aspects of VoIP are rife and ongoing. Whilst Skype currently receives much mention in Blogs regarding encryption, I believe this is narrow minded and an industry view approach needs to be adopted.
Security aspects
The Australian Communications Industry Forum (acif) suggest that world research into security issues relating to Voice Over Internet Protocol produces a very similar list including eavesdropping, denial of service, identity related attacks, spam over internet telephony and viruses.
Acif wisely advise VoIP providers that "As VoIP becomes more widely deployed in Australian business and the community the threat level will inevitably increase accordingly". They further suggest "รขโ�ฌยฆ that security issues have the potential to cause serious harm to the acceptance of VoIP as a viable alternative to traditional phone services" and therefore it is in their interest "รขโ�ฌยฆto act now and address these issues".
Emergency Services Aspects
If the service provider is providing a standard telephone service as defined by the Australian Communications and Media Authority, it is mandatory that they provide emergency service access to 000 and 106 services.
As many familiar with VoIP would know, the issue is not only with access to emergency service number(s) ie 000 and 106 services for Australia, 911 in the United States, 999 and 112 in the United Kingdom, but in Australia the location of the caller is critical as this dictates which state and area the emergency services call centre transfers the caller to.
Significant advice is provided by acif to service providers attempting to ensure that Standardised Mobile Service Area (SMSA) codes is attached when a customer makes an emergency services call. Additionally they direct that information such as Carriage Service Provider Code and Alternate Address Flag must be provided to the Integrated Public Number Database (IPND) to flag with emergency services "รขโ�ฌยฆ that the calling address may not reflect the physical location of the caller".
Rightly so, acif are blunt in the fact sheet message to service providers which warns: "The lives of your customers may be at stake. So it is absolutely critical that you allocate the correct CLI and SMSA codes as well as ensure that you provide the necessary information to the Integrated Public Number Database".
Source: http://www.acif.org.au/__data/page/13230/VoiceOverIP_Emergency_Services.pdf
But is one point still missing here. The assertion is that these processes will allow emergency services to be warned that the caller may not be in the physical location of the calling address and that confirmation will be necessary. But what happens in those cases where someone is able to dial the emergency services number but then collapses or is incoherent, or a young child dials the number but cannot give further details or the well trained superdog dials the number รขโ�ฌยฆ you get the point.
So whilst Australia is a minnow in the global VoIP developments, it is useful to note the industry forum noting the warning signs that these issues pose to the industry.
The Author has an Associate Diploma in Electronic Engineering. For further information, books or VoIP items, please visit http://www.voipworking4you.info